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Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.〔 〕〔Siegel, S.: The Contents of Visual Experience. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010〕〔Macpherson, F. & Haddock, A., editors, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.〕 Dualism and monism are the two major schools of thought that attempt to resolve the mind–body problem. Dualism can be traced back to Plato, and the Sankhya and Yoga schools of Hindu philosophy,〔(【引用サイトリンク】 title=Sankhya:Hindu philosophy: The Sankhya )〕 but it was most precisely formulated by René Descartes in the 17th century. Substance dualists argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, whereas property dualists maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance.〔Hart, W.D. (1996) "Dualism", in Samuel Guttenplan (org) ''A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind'', Blackwell, Oxford, 265-7.〕 Monism is the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities (independent substances). This view was first advocated in Western philosophy by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and was later espoused by the 17th century rationalist Baruch Spinoza.〔Spinoza, Baruch (1670) ''Tractatus Theologico-Politicus'' (A Theologico-Political Treatise).〕 Physicalists argue that only entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that mental processes will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve. Physicalists maintain various positions on the prospects of reducing mental properties to physical properties (many of whom adopt compatible forms of property dualism),〔 See also See also .〕 and the ontological status of such mental properties remains unclear.〔 Idealists maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind. Neutral monists such as Ernst Mach and William James argue that events in the world can be thought of as either mental (psychological) or physical depending on the network of relationships into which they enter, and dual-aspect monists such as Spinoza adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. The most common monisms in the 20th and 21st centuries have all been variations of physicalism; these positions include behaviorism, the type identity theory, anomalous monism and functionalism.〔Kim, J., "Mind–Body Problem", ''Oxford Companion to Philosophy''. Ted Honderich (ed.). Oxford:Oxford University Press. 1995.〕 Most modern philosophers of mind adopt either a reductive or non-reductive physicalist position, maintaining in their different ways that the mind is not something separate from the body.〔 These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, especially in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology and the various neurosciences.〔Pinel, J. ''Psychobiology'', (1990) Prentice Hall, Inc. ISBN 88-15-07174-1〕〔LeDoux, J. (2002) ''The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are'', New York:Viking Penguin. ISBN 88-7078-795-8〕〔Russell, S. and Norvig, P. ''Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach'', New Jersey:Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-103805-2〕〔Dawkins, R. ''The Selfish Gene'' (1976) Oxford:Oxford University Press. ISBN〕 Other philosophers, however, adopt a non-physicalist position that challenges the notion that the mind is a purely physical construct. Reductive physicalists assert that all mental states and properties will eventually be explained by scientific accounts of physiological processes and states. Non-reductive physicalists argue that although the mind is not a separate substance, mental properties supervene on physical properties, or that the predicates and vocabulary used in mental descriptions and explanations are indispensable, and cannot be reduced to the language and lower-level explanations of physical science.〔Putnam, Hilary (1967). "Psychological Predicates", in W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill, eds., ''Art, Mind and Religion'' (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.)〕 Continued neuroscientific progress has helped to clarify some of these issues; however, they are far from being resolved. Modern philosophers of mind continue to ask how the subjective qualities and the intentionality of mental states and properties can be explained in naturalistic terms. ==Mind–body problem== (詳細はminds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes.〔 〕 The main aim of philosophers working in this area is to determine the nature of the mind and mental states/processes, and how—or even if—minds are affected by and can affect the body. Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli that arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Someone's desire for a slice of pizza, for example, will tend to cause that person to move his or her body in a specific manner and in a specific direction to obtain what he or she wants. The question, then, is how it can be possible for conscious experiences to arise out of a lump of gray matter endowed with nothing but electrochemical properties.〔 A related problem is how someone's propositional attitudes (e.g. beliefs and desires) cause that individual's neurons to fire and his muscles to contract. These comprise some of the puzzles that have confronted epistemologists and philosophers of mind from at least the time of René Descartes.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「philosophy of mind」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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